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Abstract
A framework for data collection is proposed using principles of hermeneutic philosophy drawn from Heidegger
(1976) and Gadamer (1975). Emphasis is placed on the ontological nature of Dasein as a means of reassessing, even transcending the foundations of hermeneutic thought through the application of abstraction.
The themes identified propose a set of criteria against which the coherence and validity of the proposed
research design can be determined.

Introduction
In 1980 Bleicher made the observation that hermeneutics can be used both as an underlying philosophy and as a mode of analysis.
As an approach to human understanding, it provides the philosophical grounding for interpretivism. As a mode of analysis it
provides methods for understanding textual data (whether written or verbal). By implication, hermeneutics can be used both as
a means of informing research design (and data collection) and equally applied to data analysis.
Few researchers within the IS community have fully appreciated the opportunities Bleicher’s subtle distinction offers. The
prevailing use of hermeneutic theory generally falls into one of two perspectives: epistemological or methodological. Responding
to positivist criticisms of interpretive research, researchers such as Walsham (1995) and Klein and Myers (1999), have sought
to explain hermeneutic principles from an epistemological perspective. Such discussions advocate the use of hermeneutic
principles as criteria against which interpretive research can be evaluated. Other researchers, such as Boland (1989) and
Orlikowski (1991), have primarily applied hermeneutic principles as a means of analysing textual data, produced using nonhermeneutic methods.
Taking the ontological arguments of Heidegger (1976) and Gadamer (1975), it is possible to present a comprehensive research
approach to data collection. Focusing on the ontological nature of hermeneutic philosophy creates a powerful and timely approach
to research. Not only does it allow researchers to look at old issues with new eyes, equally, it equips them with the means of
investigating the increasingly complicated issues of human-computer interaction associated with the digital age.
This paper is organised as follows: the first section will define hermeneutics, describing its analytical purpose and outlining it’s
associated problems. The second section outlines the key elements of hermeneutic philosophy proposed by Heidegger and
subsequently extended by Gadamer, describing those principles that can be used as practical research. The final section of this
paper will conclude by integrating the themes presented into a workable framework for research design and data collection.

What Is Hermeneutics?
Put simply, hermeneutics is a theory of interpreting texts. An ‘interpreter’ is one who renders words intelligible and meaningful.
This may require some point of clarification or additional commentary, particularly when the original meaning of the text is in
dispute or remains hidden because it is “unfamiliar and alien" (Boland, 1991, p.429). Hermeneutics is consequently engaged in
two tasks: ascertaining the exact meaning-content of a word or phrase; and defining guidelines to facilitate interpretive explication.
The core analytical task of hermeneutics is to ascribe meaning via empathetic understanding (Dilthey, 1977). This approach is
not aimed at uncovering causal laws but the practical understanding of meanings and actions. Referring to this as Verstehen,
Gadamer (1975) argued that hermeneutic understanding was more than a re-constructed explanation of phenomena already
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unconsciously known. Instead, hermeneutic understanding encompassed meaning, relevance and value contained in situational
contexts.
As Bleicher (1980) notes, “Hermeneutic philosophy does not aim at objective knowledge through the use of methodical
procedures but at the explication and phenomenological description of human Dasein in its temporality and historicality.” (p.2).

The Hermeneutic Problem
The 'hermeneutic problem' is the role of the researcher in the practical acquisition of knowledge: how can researchers render
accounts of subjectively intended meaning objective given the fact that they are mediated by the interpreter’s own subjectivity
(Bleicher, 1980). Furthermore, how can we determine the validity of such inquires when the researcher uses his preconceptions
in order to guide the process of inquiry, and the necessarily close interaction with his subjects to induce contextual meanings,
changes the perceptions of both parties (Walsham, 1995).
Making interpretations of subjectively intended meaning credible and open to verification whilst critical, is clearly difficult. How
can we state something as a 'fact' when it is acquired using personal filter systems of unique individual experiences?

The Ontological Basis of Hermeneutic Interpretation
In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that phenomenology is the science of the ‘Being of entities’ and that ‘only through
phenomenology is ontology possible’ (1976, p.60). Phenomenology for Heidegger however, does not refer to experiences that
are visible and clearly defined. Of interest are those phenomena that remain hidden or somehow disguised. In attempting to
uncover such ‘essences’ Heidegger’s phenomenology provides an ontological description of Being, where meaning is a function
of ‘Being-in-the-world’ – a concept Heidegger called Dasein.

Dasein
By arguing that the first function of understanding is to orientate us (as ordinary people) to a situation, Heidegger fundamentally
altered the ontological basis of knowledge for hermeneutic thought. Understanding was no longer concerned with grasping facts
but with apprehending a possibility of being. In seeking to unfold the possibility of being, Heidegger developed the notion of
throwness where understanding is essentially projected empathy. The primary function of language is no longer communication,
but rather a form of ‘pointing out’ and ‘showing’. For Heidegger, ‘discourse is the articulation of what understanding is’ which
in turn is the “meaningful” articulation of the understandable structure of being-in-the-world’ (p.203-4).
The meanings of phenomenological description as a method according to Heidegger (1976) lie in interpretation. Dasein as a mode
of living is essentially hermeneutic in character and interpretive in constitution. People constantly re-assess their understandings
of the world in which they live through their social interactions and daily activities. The efficacy of shared meanings relies upon
the abilities of social actors to fully appreciate the nuances of conveyed intent, situated as they are in a particular time and history.

Pre-understanding and Tradition
Heidegger argues that understanding of a situation requires some fore-knowledge accumulated from experience. Phenomena are
perceived according to how they are encountered in the everyday routines and tasks, that is to say the world in which people live.
Perception and apprehension move from self-conscious interpretation to existential understanding, a largely unreflective and
automatic grasp of situations triggering pre-programmed responses or behaviour when thrown into situations of uncertainty. The
actions of social actors in such circumstances are bootstrapped from their form of pre-existing knowledge.
Such pre-existing knowledge is a product of what Heidegger called historicality. Acceptable values and experiences supporting
pre-understanding are transmitted through time and history via cultural mechanisms, providing reassurance in times of uncertainty.
Gadamer (1975) broadened the concept of Heideggerian ‘preunderstanding’ and historicality by introducing the concept of
Tradition. “Lived experience” (Erlebnis) describes the relationship between actors and the tradition in which they are embedded
providing the contexts for their understanding and contributes to the formation of their prejudices.
2002 — Eighth Americas Conference on Information Systems
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Zuhanden versus Vorhanden
In the everyday nature of a social actor’s existence, the phenomena that constitute his or her ‘life-world’ are ‘ready-to-hand’
(Zuhanden) and as such not the object of reflection. This is because they possess a degree of familiarity that is perfectly
understood in the actor’s perspective, not requiring interpretation as to their ontological status. If an event occurs that effects a
‘breakdown’ in understanding, that is challenges an actor’s conception of phenomena or uncovers its ontological status as a
phenomena for the first time, then it will require interpretation to be comprehended.
As a consequence of breakdowns, phenomena become the object of ‘theoretical’ reasoning and acquire the ontological status of
being ‘present-at-hand’ (i.e. Vorhanden). The ‘pre-understanding’ the actor has of the phenomena is the starting point form which
he will begin his interpretation of the phenomenon. According to Heidegger, this pre-understanding, which is similar to the
Gadamerian concept of prejudice, possesses historical and temporal dimensions; consequently as an anticipatory meaning, it will
require ‘working out’ in terms of the phenomenon itself in order to determine its legitimacy, origin and validity. This ‘working
out’ is intentional in that the actors will purposefully set about repairing the breakdown and adopt whatever available means to
achieve this end.

Effective-Historical Consciousness and the Fusion of Horizons
Gadamer argues that a ‘historical consciousness’ is vital if prejudices are to be understood for what they are. “Effective-historical
consciousness’ is the acknowledgement of the fact that the effect of historical events through ‘lived experience’ influences our
interpretation and hence understanding of phenomena (1975, p.65). In other words our cultural and historical environmental
factors affect the way in which actors see, and make sense, of the world (and its associated phenomena) in which they live.
Experience of effective-historical understanding is achieved when, in questioning phenomena that are present-at-hand, a person
opens up to tradition and what the phenomenon has to say, in order to allow its meaning to become evident. In attempting to
understand a phenomenon that is ‘present-at-hand’, a social actor as Dasein is confronted with several possibilities of
understanding.
Critically, an actor must enter into a dialectic with the phenomenon. Interpretation of social phenomena is never straight-forward
activity; ambiguity and conflict characterise interpretations. Through his ‘effective historical consciousness’ s/he should be aware
of the prejudices at work and will frame his questions accordingly. The ‘question’ is the mechanism that individuals use to open
up and keep open the possibilities inherent in Being – possibilities that arise in the existential relationship between the individual
and the phenomena that constitute his world. In this way s/he will become open to what the phenomenon has to say in order to
properly comprehend its horizon.
A horizon for Gadamer (1975, p.269) is simply ‘the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular
vantage point’. Horizons have definite boundaries, and although definable they are not static. In working out of prejudices –
interpreting and endeavouring to understand some social phenomenon – horizons are fused: the ‘fusion of horizons’ is therefore
the culmination of the act of understanding between interpreter and interpreted, between researcher and researched.

A Practical Framework for Data Collection.
Butler (1998) suggests that the most fundamental tenet of hermeneutics is the circular structure of understanding. Spirals of
understanding arise from interpretations of an executed action, confirming a theory by distinguishing between background
knowledge and facts.

The Structure of Understanding
Understanding is thus structured by a hermeneutic triumvirate of time-meaning-Being which provide a methodologically relevant
formulation of an ontological hermeneutic circle. The aim is not to avoid the circle, but to get into it properly since it contains
the possibility of original insight.
For Heidegger and Gadamer this involves three phases. First, it involves the self-understanding of the interpreter (the meaning
of Being), based upon a preunderstanding of ‘objects’ (Dasein as Understanding) leading to ‘projection’ (Understanding as
Interpretation). Interpretation for Heidegger is not the acquisition of information about that which is already understood (Betti’s
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‘objective’ interpretation which Heidegger considered ‘inauthentic understanding’). Rather interpretation is “the working-out
of possibilities projected in Understanding” (p.148). Understanding does not become something different; it but becomes Itself.
Hence, it is not about acquiring new knowledge but understanding existing knowledge better.
Understanding is structured beyond the confines of objectivity and directed outwards, towards the context of life. The ‘life world’
represents a form of preunderstanding or natural attitude (about something). Together self-understanding of the interpreter (Beingin-the-world) and natural attitude (preunderstanding) form the basis for the ‘potentiality-for-Being’. The interpreter appropriates
what is already understood creating an ‘in-order-to’ structure of projected understanding. Future behaviour is predicated on the
present understanding of past actions.
Heidegger terms the context and anticipation of meaning Vorhabe (or forehaving). The explication of the implicit, the
appropriation of understanding inherent within interpretation ‘is always done under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes
that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted.” Understanding is grounded in something that we see in advance
(foresight or Vorsicht). The framework of interpretability and the intuition of interpretation (i.e. meaning) leads to a third
possibility for interpretative understanding; fore-conception (Vorgriff) in which we grasp something in advance. Anything we
understand is interpreted using concepts either derived directly from it or categories that we can force on to it.
The hermeneutic of Dasein is as dependent upon the concepts and categories used to generate ‘accurate’ and verifiable
interpretations as the scientific method is when analysing ‘objects’. Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff provide the pre-suppositions
for the constitution of an ‘object’; though it must be re-iterated that there can be no object-in-itself. As such they represent a
useful framework for documenting the intuition of interpretation in a systematic manner.

The Hermeneutic Circle
With Dasein, Heidegger represents an ontological hermeneutic circle of unconscious understanding and situated behaviour. The
aim is to reflectively accept or reject those aspects of existential understanding or experiential fore-knowledge which can be respecified for theoretical development. Heidegger’s view of the hermeneutic ‘circle of understanding’ posits that understanding
is determined by the anticipatory movement of ‘fore-understanding’. Understanding a phenomenon starts with ‘preunderstanding’ or prejudice of the ‘whole’ by examining its component parts. However, understanding component phenomena
can only begin when their relationships with the ‘whole’ have been determined. The determination of these contextual
relationships is itself guided by an expectation of meaning arising from the preceding context (i.e. tradition influenced prejudice
or perceptual filters).
In other words, when a phenomenon is present-at-hand to an actor, he will possess a prejudice-laden pre-understanding of it.
Through a dialectic process he will identify its parts. Operating from a holistic perspective each part will be interpreted and its
meaning and relationship to the whole consolidated into an emergent understanding of the phenomenon. Gadamer called this a
‘subjective reflex’ adopted by an actor towards the phenomenon – the intuitive anticipation of the whole and its subsequent
articulation in the parts. See Figure 1.
Thus as Gadamer notes (1988, p.68)

Fusion 3

Fusion 2
Fusion 1

The movement of understanding always
runs from the whole to part and back to the
whole. The task is to expand in concentric
circles the unity of the understood meaning.
Harmonising all the particulars with the
whole is at each stage the criterion of
correct understanding. Its absence is
failure to understand.

Fusion of Horizons
Figure 1. Cycles in the Hermeneutic Circle

In cycling through the circle of understanding each ‘part’ will
be consolidated and so different perspectives will emerge.
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However, Gadamer argued that the understanding attained in working out this relationship – negotiating the circle – is not perfect.
The 'lived experiences' of individuals are unique and create temporally based limits, or horizons, of understanding (Gadamer 1975,
p.269). Each iteration of the circle represents a dialectic of shared understanding of temporally-based prejudices. A 'fusion of
horizons' occurs when a shared understanding is reached between researcher and subject regarding some 'part' of the whole
phenomena. To achieve fusion, the researcher must be aware of his prejudices and recognize that his knowledge is incomplete.
Such limits can be transcended through exposure to others values because their horizons conveys views and values that places
one's own horizons in relief. Gadamer's aim therefore is not to simply understand better the author’s intentions by deciphering
the world-view behind them as argued by the methodological hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Rather, the process
is to move beyond original meaning towards a 'fusion of horizons' between the different values of subject and researcher. Thus
understanding (Verstehen) is to understand differently from the initial concepts of either the subject or the researcher. See
Figure 2.

Fusion
Reconstruction
Reflection
Conversation
Prejudices

Figure 2. Stages Towards the Fusion of Horizon(s)
The framework outlined inverts the weaknesses associated with the hermeneutic problem: the role of the researcher in the practical
acquisition of knowledge is now regarded as a strength. Explicitly sensitized to his Tradition-influenced preconceptions, the
researcher is able to guide the process of inquiry in a more consistent fashion, whilst simultaneously neutralising the negative
aspects of researcher bias by making them conscious before conversation. Similarly, the changing perceptions of both parties
stemming from the necessarily close interaction with his subjects to induce contextual meanings as argued by Walsham (1995)
no longer needs to be automatically be condemned. The elicitation of implicit, often transitory ‘essences’ can now be captured
through the prism of Tradition and associated question’s designed to open up and keep one the potentiality of Being.
Using the ontological character of Dasein as an abstract concept provides a means of elevating the transparency of meaning
elicitation when used in conjunction with the hermeneutic circle. More importantly, interpretative understanding (Verstehen)
is no longer limited to the re-interpretation of an author’s intent with regard to a text but, with abstraction, becomes the
interpretation of a speaker’s intent. Dasein transcends classic hermeneutic perspectives as the passive interpretation of text and
enables researchers to actively participate in the generation of such texts.
The constructivist concepts advocated by Heidegger and Gadamer (pre-understanding, transcendental analysis and reinterpretation and construction) go some way to clarifying through systematic application the stages for attaining Verstehen. A
researcher’s pre-conceptions are created through familiarity of social, cultural and historical contexts and theoretical evolution.
These preconceptions are then re-assessed following conversations aimed at uncovering hidden meanings and are re-interpreted
in the light of what has gone before, what is understood now and what this means for the future.
By making explicit certain hermeneutic methods of inquiry and formalising them into a series of stages, the researcher is made
aware of the difference between mini-fusions of shared understanding on a particular issue, and fusion of horizons with regard
to the multiplicity of issues under discussion. Issues emerging from conversations and similar reflective activities create new
concepts transcending originally held meanings. It is these transcendental meanings, agreed by both the researcher and subject
1708

2002 — Eighth Americas Conference on Information Systems

Cole & O’Keefe/Hermeneutic Philosophy & Data Collection

that represent Fusion. Consequently, it is the nature of Fusion, within the context of the framework that helps researchers
determine when Versheten has been attained.

Conclusion
In summation, freed from the (artificial) constraints of re-constructing author intent, the philosophical concepts outlined above
transcend the limits of the Verstehen method. Dasein provides a means by which a researcher can become an active participant
in the generation of a text in a formalised manner. Reflection, the continual re-assessment of meaning and hence interpretation,
is explicitly and systematically incorporated into interpretative practice. As a result, interpretive practice is lifted from the level
of ad hoc insights towards a more systematic, and thus rigorous, formulation.
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